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Abstract: A standard view in philosophy is that knowledge entails justification. Yet recent 
research suggests otherwise. We argue that this admirable and striking research suffers from an 
important limitation: participants were asked about knowledge but not justification. Thus it is 
possible that people attributed knowledge partly because they thought the belief was justified. 
Perhaps though, if given the opportunity, people would deny justification while still attributing 
knowledge. It is also possible that earlier findings were due to perspective taking. This paper 
reports further research that directly addresses these questions. Our findings support the 
hypothesis that knowledge entails justification on the ordinary view. 
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The view that knowledge entails justification is widely endorsed by philosophers 
(Ichikawa and Steup, 2012). It might trace as far back to Plato suggesting that justification is 
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what “tethers” true belief to knowledge (Plato, 2002). There is disagreement over the level of 
justification required for knowledge. For example, infallibilists claim that justification should 
guarantee truth, whereas fallibilists claim otherwise (BonJour, 2002, p. 38 ff). There is also 
disagreement over the structure of justification, with views ranging from foundationalism (e.g., 
Descartes, 1637) to coherentism (e.g., Davidson, 1986) and infinitism (e.g., Klein, 2007). 
Moreover, there is disagreement over whether justification is a property of internal states 
(BonJour, 1985), as evidentialists maintain (e.g., Feldman and Conee, 1985, 2001) and 
reliabilists deny (e.g., Goldman, 1979). But despite disagreement over the nature of justification, 
many epistemologists nonetheless maintain that knowledge entails justification. 
 Entailment from knowledge to justification features prominently in the justified true 
belief analysis of knowledge, is retained in many post-Gettier analyses of knowledge, and even 
survives in Williamson’s (2002) primitivism. Much like the view that knowledge entails belief 
(see e.g., Rose and Schaffer, 2013; Buckwalter, Rose and Turri, 2015) and the view that 
knowledge entails truth (see e.g. Buckwalter, 2014), the view that knowledge entails justification 
is a standard assumption in contemporary epistemology.1  However, researchers have recently 
argued that new evidence undermines the assumption (Sackris and Beebe, 2014; Gonnerman et 
al, forthcoming). Their arguments are based on new evidence, deserve attention, and should 
prompt a reappraisal.  
Sackris and Beebe (2014) set out from Sartwell’s (1991; 1992) claim that knowledge is 
true belief, empirically testing a range of cases suggesting that a protagonist can know some 
 
1 One important question concerns the nature of the entailment from knowledge to justification. It is doubtful that 
the entailment is analytic in the way that “All bachelors are married men” is and it is also doubtful that the 
entailment is either logical, such as if A=B and B=C, then A=C, or metaphysical, such as water is H2O. Instead, and 
given that the ordinary concept of knowledge is what is at issue here, we will assume that the entailment is 
conceptual. 
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proposition despite lacking justification. For instance, participants were given a case featuring an 
individual, Sunil, who has become highly delusional. In a bout of delusion, Sunil is told by 
“demons” that Hilary Clinton is the current US secretary of state. (At the time the study was 
conducted, Clinton was the US secretary of state.) On this basis, he comes to believe that Clinton 
is the current secretary of state. And his belief is true. When asked whether Sunil knew—on the 
basis of his delusion—that Clinton was the current secretary of state, the mean response on a 7-
point scale was 4.85, which is significantly above the neutral midpoint. Thus there was a central 
tendency to attribute knowledge based on delusion. Assuming that delusion is not viewed as 
providing relevant justification, this is unexpected if knowledge entails justification on the 
ordinary view. 
We submit that, based on these results, concluding that knowledge does not entail 
justification would be premature. The primary concern is that participants did not rate whether 
the protagonist’s belief is justified. It could thus be the case that knowledge ratings were high 
because participants thought the belief was justified. Without asking about justification, this is a 
possibility that cannot be foreclosed. 
Another key issue is whether earlier results might be due to perspective taking. 
Perspective taking occurs when a subject takes up another’s perspective and imagines what 
seems true from their point of view (Flavell, Everett, Croft, and Flavell, 1981; Surtees, Samson, 
and Apperly 2016). Recent evidence suggests that perspective taking comes so naturally to 
humans that they engage in it automatically and unconsciously, even when doing so interferes 
with the task at hand (Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and Scott, 2010; Surtees and 
Apperly, 2012). Perspective taking has arguably played an important role in explaining 
surprising findings concerning ordinary knowledge judgments, such as the attribution of false 
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knowledge (Buckwalter 2014; Turri 2014) and potential cross-cultural disagreement about the 
relationship between knowledge and certain forms of luck (Machery, Stich, Rose, et. al., 2017a; 
Machery, Stich, Rose, et. al., 2017b). 
Perhaps perspective taking can also help explain the finding that participants attribute 
knowledge in the absence of justification (Sackris and Beebe 2014). This is amplified by that fact 
that protagonists in the scenarios studied typically assert that they know the relevant proposition. 
For instance, Sunil asserts that, “I first acquired knowledge of this fact back when I was 
delusional.”  Assertion could increase the likelihood of perspective taking by making another’s 
perspective salient and explicit. It is typical in Gettier cases (e.g., Machery, Stich, Rose, et. al., 
2015), Fake Barn cases (e.g., Colaço et al., 2014), and Bank cases (Rose, Machery, Stich, et. al., 
2017). People tend to defer to the mental state reports of others and so knowledge judgments 
may be explained by mental state deference (Turri, 2017), which could result from perspective 
taking. When coupled with a wide range of research suggesting that knowledge is the norm of 
assertion on the ordinary view (Turri, 2016a, 2017, 2018), this lends further credence to the 
possibility that earlier studies contained a mix of crucial ingredients that promoted perspective 
taking. Contrary to that suggestion, some researchers re-tested some earlier cases while 
attempting to inhibit perspective taking (Gonnerman et al., forthcoming). Though they found 
some evidence of perspective taking, they judge it to be “not all that extensive.” However, like 
Sackris and Beebe, they did not collect judgments about justification. 
So we take it to be an open question whether knowledge entails justification on the 
ordinary view. Our strategy for addressing this is to simply ask about both knowledge and 
justification. Our findings from experiment 1 conflict with previous findings challenging 
entailment (Sackris and Beebe 2014; Gonnerman et al., forthcoming): when asking about both 
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knowledge and justification, we found that justification attributions significantly exceeded 
knowledge attributions across a range of scenarios. This supports the view that knowledge entails 
justification.2 But participants in experiment 1 were only asked whether the protagonist’s belief 
is justified. It could be that participants interpreted justification in a broad way, to include not 
only epistemic norms but also moral and prudential norms. Study 2 sharpens the justification 
question, specifically targeting justification by evidence. When using this more pointed 
characterization, we found evidence of knowledge attribution exceeding justification attribution, 
albeit across a more limited range of scenarios. This speaks against entailment. However, these 
results could be due to perspective taking. In study 3, we address the question of whether our 
earlier findings might be due to perspective taking. When using response options that inhibited 
perspective taking, we found a very different pattern. Participants now tended to deny 
knowledge. We conclude that, overall, our findings support the hypothesis that knowledge entails 
justification. 
1. Experiment 1          
1.1. General methods 
The following statements are true of all studies reported here. All manipulations, measures, and 
exclusion criteria are reported. All participants were adult residents of the United States. We 
recruited and tested people using an online platform of Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(https://www.mturk.com), TurkPrime (Litman, Robinson, and Abberbock 2017), and Qualtrics 
 
2 To clarify: our claim is not that the evidence proves entailment from knowledge to justification. Hence we use 
“support” throughout. 
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(https://www.qualtrics.com). Participants completed a brief demographic questionnaire after 
testing. We used R 3.5.1 for all analyses (R Core Team 2018). All stimuli and data are available 
through an Open Science Foundation project (https://osf.io/3vds6/). All studies were pre-
registered. 
1.2. Method 
We decided in advance to recruit 50 participants per condition, plus a few extra as a precaution 
against attrition (see pre-registration). 
1.2.1. Participants 
Two hundred sixty-one people participated in the study. Their mean age was 35.12 years (range 
= 19-71, sd = 10.99), 33% (85 of 261) were female, and 95% reported native competence in 
English. 
1.2.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five scenario conditions (root, accusation, 
cheating, dream, 8-ball). Participants read a brief scenario and responded to two test statements. 
The conditions differed in the scenario that participants read. In each scenario, the agent forms a 
belief and then participants rated whether the agent was justified in the believing the proposition, 
and whether the agent knows the proposition. The scenarios differed in the agent’s role, the 
manner of belief formation, and the belief’s content. The scenario factor was not of independent 
theoretical interest and was included to support generalization of the results beyond the specific 
stimuli studied here (Clark 1973; Baayen, Davidson, and Bates 2008; Judd, Westfall, and Kenny 
2012). We adapted two scenarios from prior research on the relationship between justification 
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and knowledge attributions (Sackris and Beebe 2014), and we developed three more based on 
discussions in introductory epistemology courses and textbooks (e.g. BonJour (2002); Feldman 
(2003); Fumerton (2006)). The rationale for testing these scenarios is that they have been 
identified as potentially intuitive cases of knowledge without justification. Here is an example of 
a scenario with test statements: 
(Accusation) Andy’s daughter has been accused of a serious crime. She lacks an 
alibi and the police have gathered strong evidence against her. But, even after 
considering it all, Andy feels that she must be innocent. And in fact he is correct: 
his daughter is innocent. 
1. Andy is justified in believing that his daughter is innocent. 
2. Andy knows that his daughter is innocent. 
 
 
The test statements appeared together beneath the story and their order was rotated randomly. 
Responses were collected on a standard 6-point Likert scale, anchored with “strongly disagree” 
(= 1), “disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “slightly agree,” and “strongly agree” (= 6), arranged left-
to-right on the participant’s screen. 
1.2.3. Data analysis 
Our principal research question was whether knowledge attribution would significantly exceed 
justification attribution, either overall or in specific scenarios. To answer this question, we 
conducted a linear mixed effects analysis on participant response and followed up with 
appropriate t-tests. The model included judgment type (within-subjects: justification, knowledge) 
8 
 
and participant age and sex as fixed effects. It also included random intercepts for scenario and 
participants nested within scenario. 
1.3. Results 
The linear mixed effects analysis revealed an effect of judgment on participant response (see 
Table 1 and Figure 1) and an unpredicted marginal effect of participant sex. A follow-up paired 
samples t-test revealed that mean response was higher for the justification attribution (M = 3.99, 
SD = 1.56) than for the knowledge attribution (M = 3.73, SD = 1.64), t(260) = 2.89, MD = 0.26 
[0.08, 0.44], p = .004, d = 0.18. An independent samples t-test revealed that mean response was 
lower for males (M = 3.75, SD = 1.63) than for females (M = 4.08, SD = 1.52), t(355.24) = -
2.28, MD = -0.33 [-0.62, -0.05], p = .023, d = -0.21. A likelihood ratio test comparing the fully 
specified mixed model to a comparable model without scenario revealed that scenario 
significantly affected participant response, log likelihood = -918.7, 𝜒!(1) = 19.91, p < .001 (see 
Figure 1). 
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Experiment 1. Figure 1. Scatterplot of knowledge and justification attributions (within-subjects) 
across five scenarios (between-subjects). Scales ran 1 (“strongly disagree”) – 6 (“strongly 
agree”) with no neutral option. Dots are jittered to avoid over-plotting. 
Experiment 1. Table 1. Analysis of variance for the linear mixed model’s fixed effects. 
 Sum of squares Numerator df Denominator df F  p 
Judgment 8.858 1 261.00 8.373 .004 
sex 3.603 1 256.03 3.405 .066 
age 0.257 1 256.72 0.243 .623 
Follow-up one sample t-tests revealed that mean justification attribution was significantly 
above the midpoint in three scenarios but did not differ from the midpoint in the other two (see 
Table 2). Mean knowledge attribution was significantly above the midpoint in the same three 
conditions, no different from the midpoint in one, and significantly below it in another. In every 
condition, mean justification attribution was at least numerically higher than mean knowledge 
attribution (see Figure 1). 
10 
 
Experiment 1. Table 2. One sample t-tests comparing justification and knowledge attributions to 
the theoretical neutral midpoint (= 3.5) in all five scenarios. 
Scenario Judgment n mean SD df t p d 
Root justified 52 3.98 1.34 51 2.60 .012 0.36 
Root knows 52 3.94 1.46 51 2.18 .034 0.30 
Accusation justified 52 4.77 1.23 51 7.44 < .001 1.03 
Accusation knows 52 4.08 1.51 51 2.76 .008 0.38 
Cheating justified 53 4.34 1.29 52 4.76 < .001 0.65 
Cheating knows 53 4.23 1.49 52 3.55 .001 0.49 
Dream justified 52 3.60 1.74 51 0.40 .692 0.06 
Dream knows 52 3.54 1.73 51 0.16 .873 0.02 
8-ball justified 52 3.25 1.70 51 -1.06 .295 -0.15 
8-ball knows 52 2.85 1.67 51 -2.82 .007 -0.39 
         
1.4. Discussion 
This experiment examined whether people attribute knowledge without justification across a 
range of scenarios that are claimed to be intuitive examples of knowledge without justification. If 
these are intuitive examples of knowledge without justification, then there should be a detectable 
central tendency for people’s knowledge attributions to exceed their justification attributions. By 
contrast, if they are not intuitive examples of knowledge without justification, then there should 
be no such central tendency. Our findings support the latter prediction: on average, in a within-
subjects design, justification attribution exceeded knowledge attribution. This same pattern was 
observed regardless of whether mean knowledge attribution was above or below the neutral 
midpoint. 
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One limitation of these findings concerns the wording of the justification probe, which 
stated simply that the agent “is justified in believing” the target proposition. However, as 
theorists have often noted, the proposed justification requirement on knowledge pertains to 
justification due to evidence or information available to the agent (e.g. BonJour (2002), pp. 34 
ff.; Feldman (2003), p. 49; Fumerton (2006), pp. 4-5). They contrast this sort of justification with 
justification due to morality or prudence. Accordingly, one concern is that participants in the 
present study could have understood the justification probe broadly to include these sources of 
practical justification, rather than being restricted to justification due to evidence. The next 
experiment directly investigates this possibility by probing for justification in a way that 
specifically targets epistemic justification.3 
2. Experiment 2 
2.1. Method 
We decided in advance to recruit 50 participants per condition, plus a few extra as a precaution 
against attrition (see pre-registration). 
2.1.1. Participants 
Two hundred sixty-one people participated in the study. Their mean age was 34.44 years (range 
= 18-68, SD = 9.27), 47% (123 of 261) were female, and 96% reported native competence in 
English. 
 
3 We acknowledge that there might be some instances of intuitive, non-evidential knowledge and that in such cases 
evidential justification doesn’t play a role. Such cases are not our concern here. Instead our focus is on the kinds of 
cases that have centrally featured in the experimental literature on whether knowledge requires justification. And 
none of these cases feature putative instances of non-evidential knowledge.  
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2.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of five scenario conditions (root, accusation, 
cheating, dream, 8-ball). The stimuli and procedures were exactly the same as in experiment 1, 
with the only exception being the wording of the justification probe. Whereas in experiment 1, 
participants rated an attribution that said the agent was “justified in believing” the target 
proposition, in this experiment the attribution said “the evidence justifies the agent in believing” 
the target proposition. Here is an illustration of the difference, focusing on the probe from the 
accusation scenario: 
Andy is justified in believing that his daughter is innocent. (experiment 1) 
The evidence justifies Andy in believing that this daughter is innocent. 
(experiment 2) 
2.1.3. Data analysis 
Our principal research question was whether knowledge attribution would significantly exceed 
justification attribution, either overall or in specific scenarios. To answer this question, we 
conducted a linear mixed effects analysis on participant response and followed up with 
appropriate t-tests and binomial tests on dichotomized attributions. The mixed model included 
judgment type (within-subjects: justification, knowledge) and participant age and sex as fixed 
effects. It also included random intercepts for scenario and participants nested within scenario. 
We dichotomized responses by counting “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” and “slightly disagree” 
as a denial (coded 0), and counting “strongly agree,” “agree,” and “slightly agree” as an 
attribution (coded 1). 
2.2. Results 
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The linear mixed effects analysis revealed an effect of judgment on participant response (see 
Table 3 and Figure 2). The marginal effect of participant sex from experiment 1 did not replicate 
here. A follow-up paired samples t-test revealed that mean response was lower for the 
justification attribution (M = 3.33, SD = 1.65) than for the knowledge attribution (M = 3.8, SD = 
1.6), t(260) = -3.91, MD = -0.47 [-0.7, -0.23], p = < .001, d = -0.24. A likelihood ratio test 
comparing the fully specified mixed model to a comparable model without scenario revealed that 
scenario significantly affected participant response, log likelihood = -975.48, 𝜒!(1) = 12.91, p < 
.001 (see Figure 2). 
Critically, paired samples t-tests revealed that mean justification attribution was 
significantly higher than mean knowledge attribution in the accusation and cheating conditions 
(see Figure 2 and Table 4). The effect size for these differences was large (Cohen’s d of -0.895 
and -0.946). Table 5 shows one sample t-tests comparing mean response for both attributions in 
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all conditions to the neutral midpoint.
 
Experiment 2. Figure 2. Scatterplot of knowledge and justification attributions (within-subjects) 
across five scenarios (between-subjects). Scales ran 1 (“strongly disagree”) – 6 (“strongly 
agree”) with no neutral option. Dots are jittered to avoid over-plotting. 
 
Experiment 2. Table 3. Analysis of variance for the linear mixed model’s fixed effects. 
 Sum of squares Numerator df Denominator df F p 
Judgment 28.513 1 261.00 15.329 .000 
sex 1.800 1 256.39 0.968 .326 
age 0.582 1 259.06 0.313 .576 
Experiment 2. Table 4. Paired sample t-tests comparing justification and knowledge attributions 
in all five scenarios. 
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Scenario estimate conf.low conf.high df t p d 
Root 0.192 -0.319 0.704 51 0.755 .454 0.105 
Accusation -1.830 -2.394 -1.267 52 -6.515 <.001 -0.895 
Cheating -1.529 -1.984 -1.075 50 -6.755 <.001 -0.946 
Dream 0.226 -0.139 0.592 52 1.244 .219 0.171 
8-ball 0.596 0.213 0.979 51 3.125 .003 0.433 
Experiment 2. Table 5. One sample t-tests comparing justification and knowledge attributions to 
the theoretical neutral midpoint (= 3.5) in all five scenarios. 
Scenario Judgment n mean SD df t p d 
Root justified 52 4.10 1.62 51 2.65 .011 0.37 
Root knows 52 3.90 1.38 51 2.12 .039 0.29 
Accusation justified 53 2.77 1.65 52 -3.21 .002 -0.44 
Accusation knows 53 4.60 1.45 52 5.56 <.001 0.76 
Cheating justified 51 2.88 1.57 50 -2.81 .007 -0.39 
Cheating knows 51 4.41 1.40 50 4.64 <.001 0.65 
Dream justified 53 3.81 1.51 52 1.50 .139 0.21 
Dream knows 53 3.58 1.57 52 0.39 .696 0.05 
8-ball justified 52 3.10 1.55 51 -1.88 .066 -0.26 
8-ball knows 52 2.50 1.34 51 -5.40 <.001 -0.75 
We also examined dichotomized response options (see the data analysis section for an 
explanation of the coding procedure). Overall, 25% of participants attributed knowledge but 
denied justification, which is not different from chance rates (= .25). However, as reported 
above, the accusation and the cheating scenarios were importantly different from the others. 
Including only those two conditions for further analysis, 49% attributed knowledge but denied 
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justification, which significantly exceeds the percentage that attributed knowledge and 
justification (29%), binomial test, n = 104, k = 51, p < .001, test proportion = 0.29. Moreover, 
among those who attributed knowledge in these two conditions, 63% denied justification, which 
exceeds chance rates, binomial test, n = 81, k = 51, p = .026, test proportion = 0.5. 
2.3. Discussion 
This experiment again examined whether people attribute knowledge without justification across 
five scenarios. There was a critical difference between the justification probe used in this 
experiment compared to experiment 1. In experiment 1, participants rated whether the agent was 
“justified in believing” the target proposition, whereas in this experiment participants rated 
whether “the evidence justified” the agent in believing the proposition. Call this the difference 
between generic justification and evidential justification. If a scenario is an intuitive example of 
knowledge without evidential justification, then there should be a detectable central tendency for 
people’s knowledge attributions to exceed their justification attributions. In two of the scenarios, 
mean justification attribution was significantly below the neutral midpoint, whereas mean 
knowledge attribution was significantly above the neutral midpoint. The effect size for these 
differences was large. A similar pattern emerged when we dichotomized the scaled attributions. 
Therefore, the present results support the hypothesis that knowledge does not conceptually entail 
evidential justification. However, in light of the findings from our first experiment, the present 
results also suggest that the ordinary concept of justification for beliefs is broader than evidential 
justification. Accordingly, although our findings thus far undermine the hypothesis that 
knowledge entails evidential justification, they are nevertheless consistent with the hypothesis 
that knowledge entails generic justification, which is broader than evidential justification. 
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  One crucial question, however, is whether the tendency to ascribe knowledge without 
evidential justification is due to perspective taking. That is, perhaps participants are imagining 
what seems true from the protagonist’s point of view. If this is not occurring, then we have a 
clear case of knowledge not requiring evidential justification; if it is, then perhaps knowledge 
does indeed entail evidential justification. Our next study addresses this question. 
 
3. Experiment 3 
3.1. Method 
We decided in advance to recruit 100 participants, plus a few extra as a precaution against 
attrition (see pre-registration). 
3.1.1. Participants 
One hundred five people participated in the study. Their mean age was 39.25 years (range = 21-
72, SD = 12.71), 56% (59 of 105) were female, and 91% reported native competence in English. 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Participants read the accusation scenario from earlier experiments and responded to a single test 
item: 
Andy _____ that his daughter is innocent. (only thinks he knows / actually does know) 
3.1.3. Data analysis 
Our principal research question was whether knowledge attribution would exceed chance rates. 
To answer this question, we conducted a binomial test against chance. We counted “only thinks 
he knows” as a knowledge denial (coded 0), and we counted “actually does know” as a 
knowledge attribution (coded 1). 
3.2. Results 
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The rate of knowledge attribution was 24.8%, which is significantly below chance rates, 
binomial test, n = 105, k = 26, p < .001. 
3.3. Discussion 
This experiment examined whether the high rate of knowledge attribution in previous studies 
could have been due to perspective taking. The results support the conclusion that it was due to 
perspective taking. Two final questions are whether perspective-taking affects attributions of 
knowledge and justification differently, and whether inhibiting perspective-taking brings 
justification attribution down to at least the level of knowledge attribution across a range of 
scenarios. Our next, and final, study addresses these questions. 
 
4. Experiment 4 
4.1. Method 
We decided in advance to recruit 50 participants per condition, plus a few extra as a precaution 
against attrition (see pre-registration). 
4.1.1 Participants 
Two hundred seventy-five people participated in the study. Their mean age was 35.76 years (range 
= 20-71, SD = 10.97), 40% (110 of 275) were female, and 96% reported native competence in 
English. 
4.1.2 Materials and procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the same five scenario conditions from experiment 
1 (root, accusation, cheating, dream, 8-ball). The stimuli and procedures were exactly the same as 
in experiment 1, with the only exception being that instead of collecting responses on a 6-point 
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Likert scale, we used dichotomous response options that contrasted what the agent “thinks” with 
what is “actually” true, for both attributions. For example, here were the two attributions for the 
accusation scenario: 
1. Andy _____ in believing that his daughter is innocent. (only thinks he is justified / actually is 
justified) 
2. Andy _____ that his daughter is innocent. (only thinks he knows / actually does know) 
4.1.3. Data analysis 
Our principal research question was whether knowledge attribution would exceed justification 
attribution. To answer this question, we conducted a linear mixed effects analysis on participant 
response and followed up with appropriate proportion tests. The mixed model included judgment 
type (within-subjects: justification, knowledge) and participant age and sex as fixed effects. It also 
included random intercepts for scenario and participants nested within scenario. 
4.2. Results 
The linear mixed effects analysis revealed an effect of judgment on participant response (see Table 
6 and Figure 3). Follow-up McNemar tests revealed that in no scenario were participants more 
likely to attribute knowledge than justification. In only one scenario (dream) did knowledge 
attribution numerically exceed justification attribution (34% compared to 27%) (see Table 7). 
Overall, participants were significantly more likely to attribute justification than knowledge, 
McNemar’s test, (47% compared to 32%), 𝜒!(1) = 17.58, p = < .001, h = 0.306. 
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Experiment 4. Figure 3. Proportion of participants attribution knowledge and justification 
(within-subjects) across five scenarios (between-subjects). Error bars show 95% bootstrapped 
confidence intervals. 
Experiment 4. Table 6. Fixed effects of the mixed linear model. Reference class for sex: male. 
Reference class for knows: justified. 
term estimate standard error Z p 
knows -0.889 0.224 -3.976 <.001 
sex 0.312 0.272 1.147 .251 
age -0.024 0.013 -1.916 .055 
Experiment 4. Table 7. McNemar’s tests comparing attributions of justification and knowledge in 
five scenarios. 
Scenario statistic p df h 
Root 0.056 .814 1 0.072 
Accusation 15.750 <.001 1 0.873 
Cheating 7.682 .006 1 0.507 
Dream 0.083 .773 1 -0.080 
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8-ball 1.455 .228 1 0.212 
4.3. Discussion 
This experiment further examined whether perspective-taking might have been responsible for 
knowledge attribution exceeding justification attribution in earlier studies. The results support the 
conclusion that it was due to perspective-taking. It is worth highlighting one aspect of these results 
in particular. Results from experiment 2 suggested that, for instance, the accusation scenario might 
pose an especially strong challenge to the hypothesis that knowledge conceptually entails 
justification. But when we probed for attributions in a way intended to inhibit perspective-taking 
in the present experiment, the rate of justification attribution exceeded knowledge attribution by 
the largest margin in the accusation scenario specifically. Broadly similar remarks apply to the 
cheating scenario. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Does knowledge entail justification? Though the view that knowledge entails justification is 
widely held in philosophy, intriguing recent work suggests that, on the ordinary view, knowledge 
doesn’t entail justification (Sackris and Beebe, 2014; Gonnerman et al., forthcoming). One 
limitation of this research is that it relied on the researchers’ own interpretation of the agent’s 
belief as not justified. Participants themselves did not rate whether the agent was justified. Thus 
previous findings are consistent with participants attributing knowledge partly because they also 
attributed justification. If so, this would then support the hypothesis that knowledge entails 
justification. 
Accordingly, our strategy for advancing understanding of these issues was to ask about 
both knowledge and justification. In experiment 1, we found that when asking about both 
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knowledge and justification, justification attributions significantly exceeded knowledge 
attributions. This supports the hypothesis that knowledge entails justification. But participants in 
experiment 1 were only asked whether the relevant belief was “justified.” Thus justification 
judgments might have been due to people operating with a broad notion of justification that 
includes epistemic, moral, and prudential norms. Experiment 2 narrowed in on epistemic 
justification specifically. When asked whether the “evidence justified” believing the relevant 
proposition, we then found evidence suggesting that knowledge may not entail justification. This 
supports the hypothesis that knowledge does not entail justification. We then asked whether our 
earlier findings might be due to perspective taking. In experiment 3, we found strong initial 
evidence that they were due to perspective taking. When using response options designed to 
inhibit perspective taking, participants tended to deny knowledge. Thus, overall, our findings 
support the hypothesis that knowledge entails justification. 
Our results don’t speak to the question of the specific view that the folk operate with 
concerning the nature of justification. For example, our findings do not support (or conflict with) 
the infallibilist claim that justification guarantees truth. Nor do they speak to the question of 
whether the folk operate with a specific conception of the structure of justification, such as 
foundationalism (e.g., Descartes, 1637), coherentism (e.g., Davidson, 1986) or infinitism (e.g., 
Klein, 2007). Furthermore, our findings do not shed light on whether the folk have an internalist 
or externalist view of justification. Though the specific view that folk operate with concerning 
the nature of justification remains an open question, our findings do support the widely held 
philosophical view that knowledge entails justification.  
When asking about justification in experiment 1, the test statement asked if the 
protagonist was “justified.” This raised the possibility that people interpreted justification 
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broadly to include evidential, moral, and practical considerations, the latter two of which 
epistemologists tend to discount as irrelevant to epistemic justification. In experiment 2, we 
sharpened and refined, asking whether “the evidence justifies” the belief in the proposition. 
Thus, it is clear there is a salient difference between asking whether a protagonist’s belief is 
justified and whether the evidence justifies an agent in believing a proposition. Our findings 
demonstrate that this should be taken into consideration for further studies on justification. If one 
wants to probe for epistemic justification but merely asks whether a protagonist’s belief is 
justified, then one will pick up our norms that extend beyond the epistemic realm, norms which 
epistemologists think are epistemically irrelevant. Asking whether the evidence justifies the 
relevant belief provides a more pointed way for targeting epistemic justification and suggests a 
more pointed way to probe for epistemic justification. 
Our findings also add to the list of otherwise surprising findings on knowledge 
attributions explained by perspective taking. To take one example, early and influential work by 
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich (2001) indicated that Westerners and East Asians viewed Gettier 
cases differently. The key finding: Westerners judge that protagonists in Gettier cases do not 
know the relevant proposition while East Asians judge that protagonists in Gettier cases do know 
the relevant proposition. But more recent research suggests that this cross-cultural difference is 
due, in part, to perspective taking (e.g., Machery, Stich, Rose, et al., 2017a; Machery, Stich, 
Rose, et. al., 2017b). When asked about knowledge in a way that controls for perspective taking 
—  i.e., using  “really know” and “didn’t really know but only thought she knew” as response 
options — experimental participants across four cultures — USA, India, Japan, and Brazil — 
denied knowledge at rates that were both high and similar across the four groups (Machery, 
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Stich, Rose, et. al., 2017a). This finding has recently been extended to people across 23 
countries, speaking 17 different languages (Machery, Stich, Rose, et. al., 2017b).  
More generally, people are more likely to attribute knowledge when the answer options 
are “does know”/“doesn’t know” (plain options) than when the options are “actually 
knows”/“only thinks he knows” (contrast options) (Cullen, 2010; Buckwalter, 2014; Turri, 2014, 
2018). When using plain options, people even attribute knowledge to agents who have false 
beliefs. This disappears when using contrast options (Buckwalter, 2014). That’s because —  
as John Turri (forthcoming) notes — “contrast options don’t force participants to choose 
between responding accurately and acknowledging the agent’s perspective: they enable 
participants to distinguish appearance from reality while minimizing the risk of appearing 
oblivious or insensitive.”  
Perspective taking isn’t merely confined to epistemic judgments. It also extends to 
judgments about lying and assertability. In the case of lying, there are two main ways to probe 
for lying. One is to ask whether the protagonist “lied/didn’t lie” (plain options). The other is to 
ask whether the protagonist “actually lied”/“only thinks he lied” (contrast options). When an 
agent attempts to lie but fails (the assertion is actually true) people classify it as lying when given 
plain options. This pattern reverses when given contrast options. This is because the latter 
options—the contrast options—inhibit perspective taking (Turri and Turri, 2015, forthcoming). 
Perspective taking plays a similar role in judgments of assertability. People are sometimes 
inclined to answer that a protagonist should make a false assertion supported by misleading 
evidence when given plain options: “should assert”/“shouldn’t assert”. Contrast options —  
“actually should assert”/“only thinks he should assert” — reverse this pattern (Turri, 2016b, 
2018). 
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Perspective taking is clearly an issue when probing ordinary epistemic judgments. And it 
also extends beyond epistemology, namely, to lying and assertability. The bottom line: 
perspective taking can be a roadblock to genuine attribution. It infects epistemic judgments and 
judgments of lying and assertability. And it is pervasive. Whether it is controlled for or not can 
have dramatic implications for interpreting folk attribution, epistemic or otherwise. In this case, 
controlling for perspective taking supports the claim that knowledge does in fact, entail 
justification.  
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